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The time relationship between stock option and repurchase 
Lu Deng 
 
This paper examines the time relationship between repurchases and stock option exercises in the 
firms. Firms with more option exercised in the last year and current year are more likely to make 
repurchase decision. On the one hand, repurchase can help alleviate dilution caused by past 
option exercises. On the other hand, managers match the expenses on repurchases with the 
payment of contemporaneous option exercises to realize the stable cash flow. Total options 
outstanding also affect the likelihood of repurchase decision, which means managers may 
consider expected future option exercises in decision-making. Once the decision is made, past, 
concurrent option exercises and expected future stock option exercises are also positively related 
to actual repurchase level (dollars spent on repurchase). Contemporaneous relation is the 
strongest in both regressions as previous paper suggests. We also find that executive options 
outstanding have a positive effect on the likelihood of repurchase decision and actual repurchase 
level. This paper also uses propensity score matching method to test the effects of repurchase 
activity and high option holdings (which ranks the 1st quartile with the same industry) on firms’ 
profitability indicator ROA. We find that a high percentage of executive options, instead of a high 
holding of total stock options, has a positive effect on ROA in repurchasing firms.  
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Stock repurchases have been one of the popular research topics in corporate finance in 
recent years with researchers paying more and more attention to the rapid growth of 
stock repurchase. Since the late 1970s, corporations engage increasingly to buy back 
shares as a way of distributing cash to shareholders in addition to tradition dividends. 
According to Jolls (1998), repurchase only accounted for 7.1 percent of total cash 
distributions in late 5 years of 1970s then it surged to 25.6 percent on average 
between 1992 and 1996. Balachandran (2008) finds that repurchase behavior became 
more concentrated after 1998 and it may be the consequence of deregulation of 
legislation in 1995.  
The topic why firms repurchase stock has triggered interest of many researchers. 
Previous papers (Vermaelen, 1981; Jensen, 1986; Opler and Titman, 1996) try to find 
out the motives and they give the explanations such as excess capital distribution, 
undervaluation (signal effect) and optimal leverage ratio hypotheses. At the same time, 
researchers find that stock option grants are used increasingly by corporations.  
The concurrent increase trend made the researchers to associate stock options with 
repurchases. Many empirical studies have documented the positive relationship 
between repurchase activity and stock option. Weisbenner (2000) finds a general link 
between share repurchases and past option grants. He thinks the overall size of the 
option program can be a predictor of share repurchases since repurchase can help 
alleviate the erosion to EPS caused by stock options. Jolls (1998) illustrates 
managerial stock option can significantly affect repurchase decision. In order to 
maximize the payoff of executive option, managers are more willing to choose 
repurchases over dividends because repurchases, unlike dividends, do not reduce the 
stock price. However, Kahle (2002) gives evidence that total options exercisable, 
rather than executive options, have explanatory power on level of actual repurchase 
and this may suggest that the market has recognized the self-interest motive of 
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managers in a repurchase. Bens et al. (2003) attribute the positive relationship 
between employee options (ESOs) and repurchase behavior to managers’ financial 
reporting incentives to manage diluted EPS, given that EPS is the concern of investors 
and repurchase can decrease the shares in the market to improve the earning per share.  
Stock returns may be associated with repurchase activities and options. The 
concurrent use of repurchases and options can slow down the pace of expected stock 
retirements (firm repurchase shares and cancel them) by analysts’ and investors’ 
forecasts since repurchase and option exercises have an opposite effect on the number 
of common shares outstanding. Liang and Sharpe (1999) find this slow-down effect 
influences stock prices after calibrating the effect of expected retirements on valuation. 
On the other hand, repurchase can also be considered as a means of releasing signal of 
stock price undervaluation by management although some firms may buy back shares 
only for alleviating the dilution effect of option exercise on EPS (firms repurchase 
shares with paid-in capital rather than earnings), which makes market reaction to 
repurchase complicated and elusive. Therefore, many researchers (Dann, 1981; 
Vermaelen, 1981; Kahle, 2002) focus on the relationship between 
announcement-period returns and stock option of firms. Kahle (2002) documents a 
negative association regarding total options outstanding and stock returns since 
market can distinguish the motives of the buybacks, and recognizes that the 
repurchase used by firms may be just for funding total option exercise instead of 
releasing undervaluation signal; while he finds stock returns are positively related to 
executive options outstanding since executive options can align the interests of 
managers with those of shareholders and thus alleviate agency problem. 
Most early studies investigate the quantitative relationship between repurchase 
activity and total or executive stock option, however, few research papers pay 
attention to the time relationship of repurchase and option exercises, that is, which 
would take place first. Moreover, although announcement-period returns to 
repurchase based on stock price changes have been the considered in the previous 
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empirical studies as we discussed above, few of them examined the performance 
comparison among firms with different magnitude of repurchase and option 
programs.  
The timing of repurchase activity depends on the purposes of share buybacks. Jolls 
(1998) finds that corporate executive option holdings encourage subsequent 
repurchase decisions made by managers due to agency issues. Weisbenner (2000) 
provides evidence that ongoing repurchases are conducted over the whole life of an 
option (rather than when the option is exercised) in order to counter the dilution effect 
of past option grants on earning per share. Kahle (2002) further shows that repurchase 
can be used for funding upcoming stock option exercises, which suggests repurchases 
precede stock option exercises. By contrast, Griffin and Zhu (2010) examine the 
changes in common shares outstanding from the repurchase for 2005 through 2007 
and they report that the contemporaneous relation between repurchase and option 
exercise is the strongest compared to sequential relation, indicating that firms are 
more likely to use the buyback to correspond with current option exercises. However, 
these results based on simple comparison among coefficients in three separate 
regressions could be a problematic way since the available data in the sample is 
limited and the period of 3 years is short in the study. Moreover, according to 
Jagannathan et al. (2000), change in shares outstanding could be an imperfect and 
indirect measure of repurchase when there is any redistribution of shares in the year.  
In this paper, I use a large sample of all US companies listed on Compustat during 
2000-2019 to further explore the time relationship between repurchase and stock 
option. To be specific, firms may repurchase to fund upcoming option exercises 
according to option-funding (pre-funding) hypothesis, or they may repurchase after 
option exercises to adjust EPS in an ex-post way. Besides, it is also possible that 
repurchase and option exercises are jointly determined by firms in the year. We will 
examine both the contemporaneous relation and sequential relation and to find out 
which relation is stronger. Regarding dependent variables, I focus on both the firm’s 
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decision to repurchase shares and actual amount (level) instead of change in common 
shares outstanding. With the panel data, we would provide evidence for the 
contemporaneous relation hypothesis if the likelihood of repurchase decision or the 
magnitude of repurchase can be significantly affected by stock option exercise in the 
same year. By contrast, if firms take more ex-post repurchases to undo dilution effect 
when there are more options exercised in the year prior to buyback, sequential relation 
hypothesis would make sense in this case. 
In addition, many previous studies support that firms conduct repurchase before stock 
options are exercised (pre-funding hypothesis). To examine this hypothesis, Griffin 
and Zhu (2010) directly use option exercises in the next year. However, since the 
dependent variable is current repurchase, it is not appropriate to explain the past with 
the knowledge in the future, in other words, we cannot predict the repurchase in year t 
with the option exercises occurring in year t+1. Thus, current stock option outstanding 
can be used as a good proxy for expected future option exercises. Bens et al. (2003) 
argue that unexercisable options can also affect managers’ decisions to repurchase. 
Lin et al. (2009) document a positive effect of managerial options unexercisable on 
actual repurchases, Therefore, I choose stock option outstanding instead of current 
option exercisable to test the link between repurchase activity and expected future 
exercise. On the other hand, total option and executive option may affect repurchase 
incentive in a different way. Firms generally buy back shares in the market to avoid 
the dilution effects of total option exercise or to fund option exercises. Meanwhile, 
since repurchase, unlike dividends, would not affect the stock price, managers prefer 
to use repurchases over dividend when they hold a high level of stock option in order 
to increase their own option payoff. Thus, in our study, I distinguish between total 
option and executive option. In addition, I control other related variables which may 
affect repurchase activity (decision or actual amount). 
The results show that both likelihood of repurchase decision and the amount of 
repurchase are mainly positively affected by latest and current option exercises. Firms 
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are more likely to make decision to repurchase and increase repurchase level when 
more option is exercised in the year prior to or the year of repurchase; this is also the 
case if there is more option outstanding to be exercised in the future. Our findings also 
provide evidence for a contemporaneous relationship between repurchase and stock 
option exercises. It is possible that firms determine stock option and repurchase 
jointly rather than sequentially (Griffin and Zhu, 2010). In addition, we also find that 
firms may use repurchase to undo the dilution effect resulting from past option 
exercises. The number of options exercised in last year could be a predictor of level of 
buyback in the current year. This suggests that ex-post repurchases are conducted to 
manage basic EPS or return on equity, which reflects managers’ financial reporting 
incentive. Meanwhile, total option outstanding would be exercised in the future and 
thus firms with more outstanding options would increase repurchases in current year 
to manage dilutive EPS, which is consistent with pre-funding hypothesis. Overall, our 
results show that repurchase decisions are associated with past and current option 
exercises and actual repurchase amount are affected by past, current and expected 
future option exercise, suggesting that repurchases are both contemporaneously and 
sequentially related to stock option exercises. 
We also find that the number of executive options outstanding would positively affect 
repurchase decision and repurchase level, which supports substitution hypothesis 
(agency hypothesis). As a payout policy, repurchase would not dilute the per-share 
value of the stock. At the same time, repurchase can be a signal released by insider to 
reveal that stock price is undervalued. Consistent with signal theory, Vermaelen (1981) 
and Dann (1981) have documented positive abnormal returns during the 
announcement period. In terms of this, repurchase would offer benefit to managers 
who hold stock options to exercise. Our results show that managers prefer to take 
repurchases and increase the actual repurchase amount when there is a large number 
of executive options because of self-interest motive, although the effect is less 
positive compared to that of total option. 
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Another analysis on performance in our study contributes to understanding the 
combined effect of payout policy and stock-based compensation on companies. To 
investigate whether firms are doing better / worse when they use different 
combinations of repurchase and stock option program, I use propensity score 
matching method to compare ROA in a) firms with share buyback and many stock 
options and b) companies with share buybacks but not many stock options and c) 
companies with no share buybacks but many options from the same industry for else 
being equal. Firms with “many” stock options are defined as those with options 
(normalized by common outstanding shares) ranking in the 1st quartile within the 
same industry. 
By propensity score matching, we find that there is no significant difference in 
performance measured by ROA between a) firms with share buyback and many stock 
options and b) firms with share buybacks but not many stock options. Among 
companies that made decision to repurchase, a high holding of total employee options 
does not necessarily mean that companies perform better than those with low stock 
option. However, the firms with higher executive options generally have higher 
accounting performances. On the other hand, our analysis shows that firms with 
repurchase and many options achieve higher ROA than those only with many options. 
Repurchase is positively related to ROA in the firms with many options. This result 
could be explained by signal theory. Since repurchases are often conducted when 
managers get new favorable information regarding companies’ prospects and they 
estimate market prices have been undervalued due to information asymmetry. In this 
case, repurchase can be interpreted as a signal to show a good expectation by 
management. According to signal theory, it is not surprising that firms with many 
options as well as repurchase activities are more likely to perform better than those 
only with many options but without repurchase. It is also possible that repurchase can 
reflect an effective and active management since managers make repurchases in a 
flexible way to distribute cash as well as send mispricing signal at the right time by 
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analyzing real-time market information. Firms with such dynamic management may 
be competitive and perform better in terms of profitability in the market. On the other 
hand, firms with better profitability (higher ROA) have excess capital to distribute 
cash to shareholders by repurchases. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature on repurchases and stock options. Section 3 develops our hypothesis and 
specifies the regression model we used in the study. The data and the sample are 
presented and described in section 4. Section 5 reports our results and robustness is 
examined in section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
The past decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in repurchase activity, and thus 
many researchers focus on the various motives for buybacks in companies. It is 
necessary to include all these relevant variables when examining the time relationship 
between repurchases and stock option exercises. 
Existing literature has provided empirical evidence and has given several reasons to 
explain why firms repurchase shares in the market.  
First, excess capital hypothesis has explained repurchase activity as a distribution 
policy. Generally, firms would increase repurchases when they have more free cash 
flow or capital to distribute to shareholders (Jensen, 1986). As a substitute for 
dividends, repurchase has provided more benefit than traditional dividend payout 
because it has more flexibility and carries less obligation to investors (Liang and 
Sharpe, 1999; Brav et al., 2005). Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) find 
that firms prefer repurchases when they make temporary increase in cash flow while 
permanent increase is often positively related to dividends. Doan et al. (2011) show 
that Australian companies take advantage of the financial flexibility with repurchase 
to distribute non-permanent cash flows to shareholders. Moreover, firms conduct 
repurchases not on a regular basis as there is no future commitment or penalty 
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involved. In contrast, Guay and Harford (2000) find that the dividend-increasing firms 
are less likely to revert to levels prior to the cash flow shock. In addition, Brennan and 
Thakor (1990) find that a majority of shareholders support open market repurchases 
when there is a large distribution. Therefore, managers would consider stock 
repurchases as a better distribution policy compared to traditional dividends when 
firms have more excess cash flow. 
Second explanation associates repurchase with stock price. A firm’s stock may be 
undervalued in the market because of information asymmetry, and thus managers 
would repurchase mispriced shares to indicate that they believe the stock is 
undervalued (Dittmar, 2000). Repurchase announcement may be followed by future 
earnings surprises. Consistent with undervaluation hypothesis, Small (2014) finds that 
one of the similarities among global repurchases is positive excess returns in the short 
and long run. A recent study by Nemani (2018) suggests infrequent repurchasers are 
more likely to buy back shares to send signal of undervaluation and convey new 
favorable information about future prospect of firms. However, other studies (Chan et 
al., 2006; Balachandran et al., 2005) believe that companies buy back shares for 
manipulative purposes as repurchase can influence investors’ perceptions of firms. 
These papers imply that managers would announce repurchases under pressure to 
stimulate share price. 
Repurchase can also be related to firms’ capital structure policy to achieve optimal 
leverage ratio (Dittmar, 2000). This explanation assumes that a firm may choose to 
repurchase shares from market when its current leverage ratio falls below the target 
level. 
Regarding corporate control, firms repurchase shares to defend against takeover threat. 
Bagwell (1992) introduces upward-sloping supply curve to illustrate how repurchases 
increase the cost of unwanted takeover attempts. Doan et al. (2011) find that firms in 
Australia would be more likely to repurchase shares when managers estimate a higher 
probability of becoming takeover target. Thus, it is essential to consider repurchase 
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activity as a means of takeover deterrence. 
Nevertheless, the surge in buybacks during the 1990s may result from other different 
motives. In addition to these traditional explanations for repurchases above, 
researchers find that the rapid growth of stock option program can also be related to 
this subject.  
Most literature focus on the relationship between repurchases and managerial options 
because there is a self-interest motive for managers. Repurchases do not dilute per 
share value of stock, which can retain or increase payoff for managers when they 
exercise their stock options. Fenn and Liang (2001) find that repurchases are 
positively related to managerial stock options. Weisbenner (2000) thinks that stock 
options held by top executives and those held by employees have different effects on 
payout policy. However, the conclusions are various in different paper. Jolls (1998) 
finds that managers prefer to use repurchases over dividends when they hold a large 
amount stock options, while employee options do not affect repurchase decisions. 
However, she uses total option grants to proxy total options outstanding, which is an 
imperfect measure. Kahle (2002) studies the effects of executive options on 
repurchase decision and amount, and the results show that although both managerial 
options and employee options can influence repurchase decision, only total options 
exercisable have explanatory power on repurchase amount. In contrast, Lin et al. 
(2008) argue that managerial options exercisable have a significant effect on the 
magnitude of actual repurchases. Griffin and Zhu (2010) support that CEO stock 
options affect both the decision to repurchase and the dollar amount. Despite of 
differences, all of these past studies document evidence that managerial options have 
a positive effect on repurchase activity. 
Besides self-interest incentives of maximizing payoff, Bens et al. (2003) find that 
managers buyback shares to manage diluted EPS rather than basic EPS. Since earning 
management is widely used in modern companies, this motive may explain why total 
options influence more than executive options. Dittmar (2003) uses total options to 
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proxy managerial options to study repurchase motives and he finds a positive 
relationship. Although some studies do not distinguish executive options and total 
options, most previous literature provided evidence for the positive relationship 
between repurchases and total stock options. 
In recent years, many researchers focus on the association between buybacks and 
stock options, but few of them directly explore the timing of repurchase. Firms can 
repurchase shares from the market to fund expected future stock options or to 
anti-dilute after option exercises. It is possible that contemporaneous relation and 
sequential relation may exist at the same time. 
In fact, most prior paper assumes that firms repurchase shares before stock options are 
exercised. Stock option outstanding or stock option exercisable is usually used as a 
main variable in most paper which examines the relationship between repurchase and 
stock option. These studies offer evidence that more options outstanding drive more 
buybacks. Weisbenner (2000) finds that firms buyback shares over the life of an 
option as grants have explanatory power for repurchase. As there is high correlation 
between grants and exercises (Rogers, 2013), grants may in fact reflect association 
between option exercises and repurchases. Similarly, Kahle (2002) thinks that firms 
with more options outstanding would use buybacks to prepare for expected future 
option exercises and avoid dilution in an ex-ante way.  
However, these studies use the change in shares outstanding to research the combined 
outcomes of option exercise and repurchase, which is a problematic measure if any 
redistribution of shares is made during the year (Jagannathan et al., 2000; Rogers, 
2013). On the other hand, they do not consider the probability that repurchases are 
conducted to alleviate the dilution resulting from past option exercises since option 
exercises in the year prior to repurchase (year t-1) are not included in the studies. 
Kahle (2002) fails to add past exercises in her paper, either. However, she includes 
repurchase dummy (dummy equals 1 when the firm repurchases in the year, otherwise 
0) because repurchase decision is also an important part of buyback activity. In our 
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paper, we would test if the likelihood of repurchase decision made by managers and 
repurchase level can be affected by past, current and expected future stock option 
exercise volume.  
Except for option funding hypothesis and undo dilution hypothesis above, there is 
another argument that firms use the payments from option exercises to repurchase 
shares in the market, which implies firms time repurchase to respond to concurrent 
option exercises. Griffin and Zhu (2010) examine the time relation between buybacks 
and stock options using the data from 2005 to 2007 and provide evidence that 
contemporaneous relation is the strongest. Although they include option exercises 
occurred in the last year to study the effect of past exercises, they use exercises in year 
t+1 instead of concurrent options outstanding to explain repurchases in year t. It is not 
appropriate to explain the past with the knowledge in the future. Moreover, option 
exercises in the year just following the repurchase cannot represent total option 
exercises in the future. In addition, changes in common shares outstanding may be an 
imperfect way to measure repurchase when there is any redistribution of shares. 
Despite this, their results show that firms may consider and determine the stock option 
and repurchases jointly, which provides support for contemporaneous relation 
hypothesis. They think that the rationale behind contemporaneous relation can be 
interpreted in two aspects. First, managers try to pursue their own benefit when they 
exercise options by increasing concurrent buybacks in the year. Secondly, managers 
prefer to match payments for option exercises with the benefit from repurchased 
shares. In addition, from firms’ perspective, contemporaneous relation may suggest 
that firms consider matching cash proceeds from option payment with expense for 
repurchases to make cash flow more stable. 
Rogers (2013) shows both total option grants and exercises are positively related to 
repurchase, which is consistent with option funding theory and contemporaneous 
relation hypothesis. He argues that repurchases in advance can be used as a hedging 
strategy because firms can lock the cost when stock options are granted. Nevertheless, 
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none of these studies considers including such variable as option exercises in the year 
prior to repurchase since firms may buy back shares to avoid the dilution due to past 
option exercises. 
Most past studies focus on the stock return in announcement period (market price 
performance). Li and Mcnally (2007) find that repurchases occur after the poor stock 
performance, consistent with signal theory. Similarly, Isa and Lee (2014) claim that 
stock prices increase significantly after repurchase announcements in Malaysia. 
Balachandran et al. (2007) mention earnings performance during the buyback year, 
and they think that different performance trends may lead to different motives for 
repurchases.  
Our theoretical contribution is the accounting performance comparison among firms 
with different programs of repurchases and stock options, which can supplement the 
previous research on marketing performance since we focus on profitability indicator 
instead of stock return. This contributes to understanding the relationship between 
repurchase and stock option program on internal operating efficiency given that past 
studies pay more attention to outside market reaction. Besides, in our study, we use 
propensity score matching (PSM) to estimate the effect of repurchases and stock 
options on firm’s ROA (return on asset). PSM is a more accurate and favorable 
method to be used in observational study since it considers multiple financial 
characteristics when matching firms. This method distinguishes us from the prior 
studies which use traditional approaches to match firms by limited covariates. 
3. Hypotheses 
3.1 Time relationship between repurchase and option exercise 
Firms can time repurchase before or after option exercises, and they can also conduct 
repurchase based on level of current exercises. These arguments are discussed and 
examined separately in the previous studies while few of them consider that the 
repurchase can be a joint outcome of past, current and expected future exercises. I 
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combine all these previous hypotheses and examine whether repurchase is 
simultaneously affected by all these option exercises at the different time. 
According to option-funding hypothesis, repurchased shares can be used to fund 
expected future stock option exercises. Several prior studies give explanation on this 
hypothesis. Weisbenner (2000) presents evidence that firms gradually buyback shares 
over the life of options to undo the EPS erosion caused by past option grants. This 
implies repurchases precede option exercises. Bens et al. (2003) support option 
funding hypothesis by studying the incentives of mangers in repurchase; they find that 
firms repurchase to manage diluted EPS instead of basic EPS. This finding suggests 
firms would buyback shares when the option is in-the-money (before the option is 
exercised) to improve diluted EPS rather than repurchase after the option is exercised 
to increase basic EPS. Rogers (2013) thinks that firms may hedge price risk by 
repurchases at the time when the stock options are granted. The paper of Sonika and 
Shackleton (2020) also gives evidence that driven by flexibility, firms would buyback 
shares early in an option schedule when options are out-of-money and unexercisable, 
which supports option funding hypothesis. Despite different motives, it is natural to 
expect that firms time repurchases before the options are exercised. 
By contrast, it is also possible that firms repurchase shares after stock options are 
exercised. Since buybacks can decrease the denominator when calculating earnings 
per share, firms may use repurchase to improve financial ratios. Hribar et al. (2006) 
report that firms buyback shares from the market to match analysts’ forecasts out of 
manipulation. On the other hand, as repurchase can substitute discretionary accruals 
in earnings management (Lin et al., 2009), firms may buyback shares to alleviate 
erosion to EPS caused by past option exercises. Following this line of thought, the 
latest option exercises would be more of interest since firms adjust financial ratios 
every year. 
Sequential hypotheses states that firm repurchase before or after options, as we 
discussed above. However, Griffin and Zhu (2010) get the new finding that 
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repurchase and stock option exercises show a contemporaneous relation. This may 
suggest that firms repurchase in response to option exercises in the same year. We will 
discuss this relation in detail in the section 3.2. 
Combing both sequential and contemporaneous relation hypotheses, we expect 
repurchase decision by firms can be an outcome simultaneously affected by these 
options exercised in the different time. In addition to repurchase decision, we are also 
interested in actual amount of repurchase. Previous studies (Kahle, 2002; Bens et al., 
2003) also research repurchase activities of firms from these two different aspects. 
Kahle (2002) finds that managerial options only influence repurchase decision rather 
than actual amount of repurchase. Bens et al. (2003) argue that both repurchase 
decisions and repurchase level are affected by executives’ incentives to manage 
diluted EPS instead of basic EPS since actual employee stock option (ESO) exercises 
do not influence repurchase decisions. In our paper, we study the effects of option 
exercises in the different time on repurchase decision as well as repurchase level. 
Hence, we replace the likelihood of decision to repurchase with repurchase level. 
Similarly, we expect the actual amount of repurchase in the year t is also a combined 
outcome of option exercises in the different time. We derive our first hypothesis 
focusing on repurchase decision as well as repurchase level: 
H1: The likelihood of a repurchase decision as well as the actual dollar amount of 
repurchase (repurchase level) is simultaneously positively related to latest, 
contemporaneous and expected future option exercises.  
3.2 Contemporaneous relation hypothesis 
In the 3.1, we suggest that firms may increase repurchases when there are more option 
exercises in the same year. Employees only exercise if options are in-the-money so 
firms need to either purchase shares from the market at a higher price or issue new 
shares which would dilute per share value of stock. Since firms can receive the 
payment from the option exercises, they may use the proceeds to subsidize concurrent 
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buyback of shares. In this way, the cash flow would be more stable if the timing of 
repurchases match the option exercises from the perspective of the firms. Griffin and 
Zhu (2010) find that the contemporaneous relation between repurchases and option 
exercises is stronger than the sequential relation. From the perspective of executives, 
they explain such stronger contemporaneous relation as managers may match their 
outlay for option exercises with the benefit earned from repurchased shares. Although 
they use option exercises occurring in the next year following buybacks to proxy 
expected future option exercises, which is an imperfect measure, the paper provides 
support that firms may repurchases more in response to concurrent option exercises.  
It is possible that firms repurchase shares in response to past, concurrent and expected 
future (not only upcoming ones) stock option exercises. Besides, as Griffin and Zhu 
(2010) suggest, option compensation and buyback may be mutually rather than 
sequentially determined. To examine this, we expect the concurrent option exercises 
in the same year of repurchase influence more than latest options (which can be 
represented by option exercise in the year prior to repurchase) and options to be 
exercised in the future (which can be proxied by options outstanding). Then, we 
derive our second hypothesis stating that  
H2: The relation is stronger for contemporaneous option exercises as compared to 
latest option exercises and expected future option exercises (sequential relation). 
3.3. Repurchase and performance of the firms 
Apart from time relationship between repurchases and stock options, we also 
interested in the effect of joint use of repurchase and stock option program on firms’ 
performance. Previous literature studies announcement-period return for repurchases 
and they focus on the association between repurchases and firms’ price performance 
in the market. However, in this paper, we hypothesize that repurchase and stock 
options can be also associated with firms’ accounting performance such as 
profitability indicator ROA. Share repurchases are typically a part of the payout 
16 
 
policy in companies. According to excess capital hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1984; 
Jensen, 1986; Dittmar, 2000), firms can retain or distribute excess cash to their 
shareholders when their capital surpass investment opportunities. If the firms profit 
more and have excess capital, they are more likely to be able to distribute funds to 
shareholders. Moreover, undervaluation arises when such earning increase is not 
reflected in the stock price. In this case, repurchased can be used not only for 
distributing funds but also for releasing undervaluation signal to the outside market. 
Following this line of thought, it is possible that firms that have a higher profitability 
are more likely to repurchase shares in the expectation that future share prices 
increase and thus more capital can be transferred to shareholders (distribution) as 
compared to firms with lower profitability. Alaagam (2019) finds that there is a 
positive significant relationship between ROA and short-term stock prices, which 
supports our argument. Moreover, Fitri et al. (2016) document a significant 
association between ROA and dividend payout ratio. It suggests that a higher 
profitability may affect the distribution in the company.  
Besides, due to information asymmetry between insiders and outside shareholders, 
managers can get favorable news and predict there is earning surprise, but market 
does not aware of it (Dittmar, 2000). Thus, managers can repurchase shares to convey 
the information on good prospects of firms (Vermaelen, 1981; Dann et al., 1991; Bens 
et al., 2003). In this case, we can reasonably predict that positive earning surprises are 
typically followed by repurchase decision and thus repurchasing firms are more likely 
to perform better than those without repurchases. 
As is shown in the literature part, there is an argument that firms repurchase shares to 
fight against hostile takeover (Bagwell, 1991), and thus it is possible that firms 
repurchases are just for defend themselves from being acquired by other firms, not for 
releasing optimism signal Repurchase, in this case, is not necessarily related with 
better performance (higher ROA). However, Jolls (1998) thinks that a higher level of 
stock option is a characteristic of well-run organizations; those organizations are less 
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vulnerable to takeover threats. Therefore, repurchases that occurred in the firms with a 
high level of stock options are more likely to be correlated with the motive of 
showing better prospects instead of takeover defense. Following this line of thought, 
we can reasonably associate firms’ good operating performances with joint use of 
repurchases and stock option plans. 
Summarizing we expect ROA to be higher for a) firms with share buyback and many 
stock options perform as compared to b) companies with no share buybacks but many 
options from the same industry for else being equal.  
H3: Firms with share buyback and many stock options perform better in ROA than 
firms with no share buybacks but many options from the same industry for else being 
equal. 
3.4. Stock option and performance of the firms 
Stock option, as a kind of stock-based compensation, can mitigate agency problem 
because it aligns employees’ (or managers’) interests with shareholders and thus leads 
to higher management efficiency.  
Since employees granted with stock options have the right to purchase shares at a 
specified price, they have the incentive to maintain or increase the stock prices to 
maximize their payoff. Thus, managers have an incentive to improve firm 
performance to positively influence stock performance. Consistent with this theory, 
Duffhues et al. (2002) report that firms’ operating performance is positively related to 
stock option grants by investigating all the companies in the Netherlands. They also 
find that stock option grants would lead to higher firms’ performances in the 
subsequent years. Sesil and Kroumova (2005) find that both small and large firms 
with broad-based stock options perform better than their peers without stock options. 
Therefore, we can infer that firms with stock options are more likely to do well, 




H4: Firms with share buyback and many stock options perform better in ROA than 
firms with share buybacks but not many stock options from the same industry for else 
being equal.  
4. Data and Methodology  
4.1 Sample Construction and industry distribution 
The sample is gathered from all the US companies listed in Compustat database and 
by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for fiscal year 2000 through 
fiscal year 2019. Financial institutions, transportation companies and utilities (SIC 
one-digit of 6 or 4) are excluded because they are highly regulated and their motive of 
repurchases could be different from other companies (Dittmar, 2000).  
To obtain the data on the actual dollar amount of repurchase, I begin by collecting 
data on purchases of common stock and preferred stock from all the North American 
companies listed on Compustat, since Kahle et al. (2005) find that purchases of 
common stock (adjusted for changes in preferred stock) can accurately measure actual 
repurchases.. The main sample consists of 15,381 firms and 130,970 firm-year 
observations. Data on employee option exercise is taken from Compustat. For the 
total option outstanding in year t, I use the average number of total option outstanding 
at the beginning and end of the fiscal year t. The sample shrunk to 73,585 firm-year 
observations after removing the observations without available data on total options.  
Executive options outstanding are computed as the sum of unexercised exercisable 
options and unexercised unexercisable options reported in Execucomp database for 
each year over all executives. In line with the literature, total executive options in year 
t are normalized by the number of common shares outstanding in year t.  
We obtain firm data such as cash flow, market value, total asset and long-term debt 
from Compustat. Since a firm’s repurchase behavior can be affected by outside 
takeover threat, takeover object is taken from Security Data Corporation’s Merger and 
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Acquisition database (SDC). Data on institutional ownership as a percentage of 
common shares outstanding is collected from Thomson Reuters. Besides, monthly 
holding period stock returns (Ret) are taken from CRSP.  
After combining data on repurchases with executive options data and other financial 
controls, I remove those observations for Canadian firms to get the final sample for 
US firms. Our final sample consists of 1,940 firms and 18,483 firm-year observations 
with no missing data on repurchase and options.  
Table 1 presents the industry distribution of our final sample. Across 18,483 firm-year 
observations, business services industry has most of observations (14.5%). About 8.2% 
firm-year observations are from retail industry, followed by chips (8%), petroleum 
and natural Gas (5.7%) and pharmaceutical products (5.5%). The firm-year 
observations of these five industries account for over 40% of our sample. 
— Insert Table 1 about here — 
To test Hypothesis 3, we select repurchasing firm-year observations from the full 
sample. After combining the merged dataset with firm specific data, such as ROA, 
cash flow, market to book ratio, firm size, return and leverage, takeover, we are left 
with 12,412 firm-year observations.  
Similarly, to test hypothesis 4, we select the firm-year observations with many options 
(options outstanding normalized by common outstanding shares rank in the 1st 
quartile within the same industry in the same year) in the full sample, along with the 
same firm-specific data. This left us with 4,891 firm-year observations. 
4.2 Variable definitions 
To study repurchase decisions made by firms, we use a dummy variable (RepuDummy) 
as the dependent variable to represent the repurchase activity. The value of dummy 
takes 1 if the firms conduct repurchase in the fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise. 
For repurchase level in year t, we use the actual dollar amount in the year t 
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normalized by average market value of equity in year t; average market value can be 
defined as the average of market value in the end of the fiscal year t-1 and in the end 
of fiscal year t. Compustat offers data on dollar amount for repurchases of the firms, 
however, the data may overstate actual repurchases outlay regarding common shares. 
(Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Jagannathan et al., 2000). Weisbenner (2000) 
improves the measure by adjusting the dollars spent on repurchasing preferred stock 
in the calculation. Therefore, in this study, I follow his method and use the actual 
dollar volume of repurchase (purchase of preferred and common stock deducted by 
purchases of preferred stock) in fiscal year t normalized by average market value of 
the firm in fiscal year t.  
The number of total options exercised (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡) in fiscal year t can be collected 
from Compustat (Optexd). Following Griffin and Zhu (2010), we can use this variable 
to estimate the contemporaneous relation between repurchase and concurrent option 
exercises. 
The number of total options outstanding (𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑡) in fiscal year t is equal to the 
average of options outstanding in the beginning of the fiscal year t and in the end of 
the fiscal year t. This variable can be used as a proxy for expected future option 
exercises.  
Executive options outstanding (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡) for each firm are calculated by 
adding the number of stock options held by each executive in the fiscal year t, taken 
from Execucomp database.  
Employee options outstanding (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡) for each firm in fiscal year t 
are non-executive options, the remaining part of total options outstanding after 
excluding executive options outstanding. All option data is normalized by common 
shares outstanding in responding year.  
Following previous research, we include following financial control variables related 
to repurchase from Compustat Database for each year t:  
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1) The level of cash flow, this variable can measure the ability of firms to distribute 
excess capital. According to excess capital hypothesis, repurchase can be affected by 
the ability of firms to distribute funds, thus we control such effect in our analysis. 2) 
The market value to book value of assets (MB ratio) as a proxy of the investment 
opportunity for the firm (Weisbenner, 2000; Rogers, 2013; Sonika and Shackleton, 
2020) can be calculated as market equity plus long-term debt plus debt in current 
liabilities plus preferred stock, divided by the book value of assets following Kahle 
(2002). We include this variable since firms faced with good investment opportunities 
may prefer invest capital in the market over repurchase to distribute. 3) The firm size 
can be used as an indicator of degree of information asymmetry (Vermaelen, 1981). 
According to undervaluation hypothesis, information asymmetry can lead to 
undervaluation favoring repurchases. 4) The leverage ratio measure firms’ financial 
stress when they make decision to fund or invest in the market. Repurchase can be 
associated with this indicator as company policy made by management would take 
financial status into account. 
According to takeover deterrence hypothesis, takeover threat motivates managers to 
repurchase to fight for control right of firms. Therefore, I include a takeover dummy 
which equals 1 if the firm is a target of takeover action in either the year before or the 
year of the repurchase, otherwise 0 following Dittmar (2000). The information can be 
taken from Security Data Corporation’s Merger and Acquisition database (SDC).   
Some researchers pay attention to the tax considerations in the study of repurchase. 
Grullon and Michaely (2000) think that firms use repurchase to reduce tax liability 
especially for individual shareholders. It is possible that tax status is highly related to 
distribution policy since there is tax differential between capital gains (repurchase) 
and dividends. Here I include institutional ownership to control the effect of tax status 
of firms, taken from Thomson Reuters.   
We use return to measure the market performance of the specific stock. This variable 
serves to control the motive of repurchase due to price undervaluation since firms 
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with low stock return are more likely to face with undervaluation problem. 
In order to examine the hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4, we include ROA in our study. 
ROA (return on assets) is defined as net income divided by average total assets, and it 
typically indicates firms’ profitability. High ROA suggests that firms perform well 
and produce more profits from its total assets, reflecting high operating efficiency of 
firms This variable is included to help us compare accounting performance among 
firms with different strategy of repurchase and options. 
Table 2 provides the detailed description and data sources for all explanatory and 
control variables. 
— Insert Table 2 about here — 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3 provides summary statistics on the repurchase and option programs, as well as 
firm characteristics. Panel A, B and C give statistics on full sample, repurchasing and 
non-repurchasing subsamples respectively. All quantitative variables in the regression 
are winsorized at the 1- and 95-percentiles. Previous studies also use winsorization to 
reduce the effect of outliers (Bens, 2003; Balachandran, 2008). 
— Insert Table 3 about here — 
Across the 12,412 firm-year observations for repurchasing group, total option 
exercises (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡) represent on average 1 percent of common shares outstanding, 
which is higher than that in non-repurchasing group with 0.9 percent. However, the 
mean percentage of total option outstanding (𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑡) for non-repurchasing group 
is 6.7 percent while this percent for repurchasing is 5.8. Besides, non-repurchasing 
group has a little higher holding of executive options outstanding (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡) 
than repurchasing group, with means of 2.4 percent versus 1.8 percent and medians of 
1.8 percent versus 1.3 percent, respectively. However, p value suggests that the 
univariate differences in mean for these options are significant and multivariate 
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results would be given in the next section, 
In terms of return on assets (ROA), repurchasing group is significantly doing better 
than non-repurchasing group, according to Table 3, with means of 6.3 percent versus 
0.9 percent and medians of 6.4 percent and 3.6 percent, respectively. ROA can reflect 
the profitability of firms. This significant difference between repurchasing group and 
non-repurchasing group may suggest that ROA could be positively related with 
repurchase in the firms.  
Table 3 suggests, the repurchasing group have higher levels of cash flow (0.1) than 
non-repurchasing group (0.05) and the difference in means is significant. It may 
suggest that firms with higher levels of cash flow are more likely to conduct 
repurchase to distribute excess fund.  
The size of repurchasing group is significantly larger than that of non-repurchasing 
group (means of 7.6 versus 6.9, respectively), which may indicate a general positive 
relationship between repurchase and firm size.  
Besides, repurchasing group experience lower stock returns than non-repurchasing 
group (means of 0.1 and 0.14). This significant difference is also consistent with 
undervaluation hypothesis (Comment and Jarell, 1991; Dittmar, 2000). Firms with 
lower returns are more likely to repurchase shares from the market to release 
undervaluation signal.  
We also find that repurchasing group has a significantly higher probability of being 
object of takeover (0.44) than non-repurchasing group (0.15). Firms faced with 
outside takeover threat are more likely to repurchase, which is consistent with 
takeover deterrence hypothesis. 
4.4 Methodology 
We use the panel data instead of cross-sectional panel data to examine our hypotheses. 
Some previous paper (Jolls, 1998; Weisbenner, 2000) use cross-sectional data, 
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however, Weisbenner (2000) suggests that the analysis of panel data allows 
researchers to control the fixed effect associated with firm-specific differences in the 
study. 
To test our Hypothesis 1, that the likelihood of repurchase decision and volume is 
positively related to option exercises in the different time, we estimate logistic 
regressions (eq 1) with repurchase dummy and Tobit regression (eq 2) with 
repurchase volume (REPt) as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡,𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∙
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽6 ∙ Γ𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡     (eq 1) 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡,𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∙
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽5 ∙ 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽6 ∙ Γ𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡  + 𝑖,𝑡         (eq 2)   
Where 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡,𝑖 measures repurchase activity of firm 𝑖 in fiscal year 𝑡. 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡,𝑖   represents contemporaneous option exercises in fiscal year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖, 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡−1,𝑖   represents latest option exercises in fiscal year 𝑡 − 1 for firm 𝑖, and 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 represents the expected future option exercises in fiscal year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖  
If more options exercised this year encourage firms to make repurchase decision, we 
expect 𝛽1 to be significantly positive. If firms consider repurchasing shares to do 
earning management since past option exercises increase shares and dilute value per 
share, then we expect 𝛽2 to be positive. 
Total option outstanding in year t is used as a proxy of expected future option 
exercises to examine whether firms consider expected future option exercise when 
they repurchase shares, which is of the topic of option funding hypothesis. If firms 
repurchase shares in response to expected future exercises, then we expect 𝛽3 to be 
positive. 
Griffin and Zhu (2010) use stock option exercise in year t+1 to represent expected 
future option exercises. However, I choose total stock option outstanding in fiscal 
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year t instead of option exercises in the year following repurchase (year t+1) because, 
on the one hand, firms with repurchase in year t cannot know the exact number of 
option exercises in the next year, on the other hand, the option exercises occurring in 
the following year cannot represent total future option exercises. Total exercisable 
stock options sometimes can be used to proxy expected future exercises; however, 
total stock option outstanding can be more representative since unexercisable option 
can be vested and exercised in the future. Moreover, previous studies show evidence 
that unexercisable options also have effect on repurchase activity (Bens et al., 2003; 
Lin et al., 2009). 
If the contemporaneous relation is stronger as compared to latest or expected future 
relationship, 𝛽1 should be statistically significantly larger as 𝛽2 and 𝛽3.  
According to the agency hypothesis, managers may initialize repurchases to pursue 
higher stock returns when they hold options, thus executive option outstanding 
(𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) in year 𝑡 for firm 𝑖 is added to examine this effect. If managers 
prefer repurchase because of self-interest motive, we expect 𝛽4 to be positive. 
Furthermore, managerial options are sticky in nature, thus executive option 
outstanding (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡−1,𝑖) in year 𝑡 − 1 for firm i is also included in the 
analysis to control such effect. 
Γ𝑡−1,𝑖 is a vector of firm specific control variables including cash flow, firm size, 
market to book ratio, stock return, leverage, and institutional ownership as well as 
takeover dummy. These control variables are used to control and reflect other 
traditional motives of repurchase. 𝜃𝑡  year indicators as well as 𝛿𝑖 industry 
indicators are also included to control fixed effects in the regression. The repurchase 
can be influenced by policy implementation or adjustment in some years (for example, 
tax reform or new accounting standard adoption), and thus year indicators can be used 




We use total option outstanding in fiscal year t (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) to estimate expected 
future option exercises in eq (1), at the same time we control the managers’ incentive 
by adding executive option outstanding (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖). The effect of variable 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 on repurchase decision may be from (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖). Therefore, we 
re-estimate expected future options exercises either by only including total option 
outstanding (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) or by separating total option outstanding (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) into 
executive option outstanding (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) and employee (non-executive) option 
outstanding (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖). This leads to other versions for eq (1): 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡,𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∙ Γ𝑡,𝑖 +
𝛿𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡                                              (eq 3) 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡,𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡−1,𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∙
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛽5 ∙ Γ𝑡,𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡                     (eq 4)          
To test the relationship between repurchase volume and option exercises in the 
different time the 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡,𝑖 dummy is replaced by 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡 representing the 
dollar level of repurchase in fiscal year t. All other things being equal, a Tobit model 
is used to estimate eq (2) because many firms do not repurchase in some years. 
The definition and calculation of 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑡 are discussed in variable descriptions. Option 
variables and financial controls are defined as shown in Table 2. 
Similarly, if firms consider past (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡−1,𝑖), current (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡,𝑖), expected future 
option exercises (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) at the same time when they determine repurchase level 
for firm i in year t, then we expect the coefficients of total option exercise in year t (𝛽1) 
as well as in year t-1 (𝛽2) and total option outstanding in year t (𝛽3) would be 
significantly positive.  
Besides, if the contemporaneous relation is still stronger as compared to latest or 
expected future relations, 𝛽1 should be statistically significantly larger as 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 
in eq (2). 
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To test the hypothesis 3 and 4, propensity score matching method (PSM1) is used in 
Stata (psmatch). Traditional approaches match repurchasing observations with 
non-repurchasing observations by industry classification (Sic code) or single financial 
characteristic such as market value. By contrast, propensity score matching method 
can alleviate or eliminate selection bias in observational studies since it considers 
more comprehensive financial characteristics when matching firms. Thus, the results 
from propensity score approach is more accurate when estimating treatment effect for 
the observational data. This study uses cash flow, market to book ratio, firm size, 
stock return, leverage and takeover dummy to represent similar firm characteristics. 
The firm in the control group (non-repurchasing group) can be matched with another 
firm in the treatment group (repurchasing group) if they have a close score.  
In our test for hypothesis 3, we select only firms with repurchases from our full 
sample (repurchasing subsample – Panel A in Table 3). Among these firm-year 
observations, we define firms with “many” stock options as those with options 
(normalized by common outstanding shares) ranking in the 1st quartile within the 
same industry (according to Fama French 48 industrial classifications) in the same 
year. Then we divide this subsample into two groups: 1) firms with repurchases and 
many stock options (high-level group) and 2) firms with repurchases but without 
many options. Propensity score matching in Stata allows us to test if a high level of 
stock options holdings (binary treatment variable) in the firm leads to a significant 
difference in mean ROA between high-level group and the matched subjects in 
non-high-level group. In other words, we can examine whether firms with share 
buyback and many stock options perform better in terms of profitability than 
companies with share buybacks but without many stock options. If stock options 
reduce the degree of agency issue, then we expect a significant positive coefficient for 
“many” options. 
                                                             
1  A propensity score is the probability that a firm would take certain action 
considering its multiple characteristics 
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Similarly, in order to examine hypothesis 4, whether repurchase behavior has a 
positive effect on ROA, we select the firms with many stock options from the full 
sample and then divide them into repurchasing group and non-repurchasing group. 
We also use propensity score matching method to estimate treatment effect of 
repurchase on firms with many stock options outstanding. If the difference between 
mean ROA in repurchasing group and mean ROA for non-repurchasing subjects in the 
matched sample is significant according to the PSM result. We may be able to answer 
the question if 1) the firms with share buyback and many stock options perform better 
in ROA than 2) companies with no share buybacks but many options from the same 
industry for else being equal. 
5. Results 
5.1 Results for Model I on repurchase decision 
Table 4 reports the results of Logistic regression on repurchase dummy. The estimates 
from Logistic models provide support for our hypotheses 1a and hypotheses 2. 
— Insert Table 4 about here — 
From the column (1), we find that both total option exercise (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡,𝑖) and total 
option exercised in the last year (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡−1,𝑖) are positively related to the likelihood 
of stock repurchases. Moreover, the magnitude of coefficient of current option 
exercises (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡,𝑖) is significantly greater than that of latest (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡−1,𝑖) and 
expected future option exercises (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖). 
The results suggest that firms are more likely to make repurchase decision when a 
higher volume of option is exercised in the same year and last year or when a high 
volume of option outstanding is to be exercised in the expected future.   
It is possible that dilution effect caused by latest and current option exercises is 
considered when management makes distribution decision. Lee and Alam (2004) 
document a positive association between the likelihood of stock repurchases and EPS 
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dilution, which supports undo-dilution hypothesis.  
Although option exercises both in the year of repurchase and in the year prior to 
repurchase are positively associated with repurchase decision, we find that the 
contemporaneous relation is stronger than sequential relation as the difference 
between concurrent exercise and latest exercise is positive and significant at the 0.01 
level, which is consistent with previous literature (Griffin and Zhu, 2010). 
The result from Logistic regression also indicates that total options outstanding 
 (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) is positively related to likelihood of repurchase and the coefficient is 
significant at the 0.05 level. This may suggest more options outstanding would 
encourage firms to make decision to repurchase. Since option outstanding is a proxy 
of expected option exercises in the future. It is possible that firms repurchase shares to 
fund expected future option exercises, which is consistent with option-funding 
hypothesis. 
Similarly, the coefficient of option exercised in the same year of repurchase 
(𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡,𝑖) is significantly larger than that of options outstanding(𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖). It 
suggests that the repurchase decision is more affected by concurrent option exercises 
than expected future option exercises. This also gives support that contemporaneous 
relation is stronger than sequential relation. 
In addition, executive option outstanding (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) has a positive effect on 
the probability of a repurchase decision-making. Since repurchase, unlike dividend, 
does not dilute per-share value, as a result, the stock price would not be affected in 
this case, managers who are granted with options are concerned about the payoff 
which depends on the stock price. Thus, in order to maintain per share value of the 
stock and maximize their own option payoffs, managers have incentives to distribute 
cash by repurchase instead of dividends for their own interest (Kahle, 2002; Voss, 
2012). Our result is consistent with agency hypothesis.  
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Then we exclude executive option in the regression above, and the results in column 
(2) suggest that likelihood of repurchase decision is affected by past, concurrent and 
option outstanding in general, however, the effect of concurrent option exercises on 
repurchase decision is only significantly stronger than that of expected future option 
exercises. It is possible that we do not distinguish the effect of expected future option 
exercises and executive options on repurchase, and thus total option outstanding in 
this case combines the effect of the option funding and manager self-interest motive 
on repurchase. Then we separate total option outstanding in fiscal year t (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) 
into executive option (𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) and employee (non-executive) option 
(𝐸𝑚𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖), the results in column (3) show that the coefficient of 
concurrent option exercise is significantly larger than employee option outstanding. 
Tradition motives still influence repurchase decision as Table 4 suggests. The 
coefficients of cash flow and firm size are significant and positive. This result 
indicates that firms with higher cash flow and large firms are more likely to 
repurchase. Firms would increase actual amount of repurchase when they have more 
funds available to distribute to their shareholders, which is consistent with excess 
capital hypothesis. Typically, large firms are less vulnerable to information asymmetry 
than small firms (Chae, 2005), which implies that they are less likely to release price 
undervaluation signal to the outside investors by repurchasing. On the other hand, 
firm size is often associated with cash available. Larger firms may have stronger 
ability in collecting fund and making a profit and thus they have more excess cash 
available, which can be used for buybacks. 
Besides, takeover is positively related with repurchase dummy. Firms which are 
potential takeover targets are more likely to repurchase to defend themselves from 
being acquired, because repurchase typically increase the acquisition cost (Dittmar, 
2000). 
As we expect, both stock return and leverage are negatively related to the likelihood 
of repurchase. Firms experiencing high stock return are less likely to release 
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undervaluation signal by repurchase, which is consistent with undervaluation 
hypothesis. Firms repurchase when managers believe the stock price is undervalued. 
Huang et al. (2013) investigate insurance companies and find that stock 
undervaluation is followed by a positive market reaction to open market repurchase 
announcement. In addition, the coefficient on leverage is negative and significant at 
the 0.01 level. This result suggests that firms with lower leverage ratio are more likely 
to repurchase. Financial stress due to debt can stand in the way of distributing cash to 
shareholders. It is not surprising that firms under high financial stress are less willing 
to use repurchase to distribute funds. Another explanation links repurchases with 
capital structure, stating that firms repurchase shares with attempt to increase leverage 
ratio when firms are below the optimal or target ratio (Opler and Titman, 1996; 
Dittmar, 2000). 
MB ratio is often used to proxy for investment opportunities. The coefficient is 
significant and positive, which is different from the argument that firms are less likely 
repurchase when they are faced with good investment opportunities (Weisbenner, 
2000; Rogers, 2013). However, Teng and Hachiya (2011) find that Japanese firms 
with high MB ratio become more willing to increase repurchase as a result of 
regulatory reform. In addition, the coefficient of institutional ownership is 
insignificant, which may suggest tax differentials are not of their concern when 
managers make repurchase decision. 
5.2 Results for Model II on repurchase level  
Column (A) of Table 5 shows the results from estimating Tobit model (2).  
— Insert Table 5 about here — 
We find that total option exercised both in the year t (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡,𝑖) and in the year t-1 
(𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡−1,𝑖) and option outstanding (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) have a significant positive 
relationship with repurchase level in the year t, which suggests that repurchase level 
increases with more latest, concurrent and expected future option exercises in the firm. 
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Moreover, the coefficient of total option exercised (0.43) is significantly greater than 
that of option exercises in the last year and that of total option outstanding at the 0.01 
level, suggesting that contemporaneous relation is strongest in repurchase level. This 
result is similar with what we got in the analysis on likelihood of repurchase decision. 
It is reasonable to find out such similar time relationship between repurchase level 
and option exercises.  
Options exercised in the year prior to repurchase (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡−1,𝑖) positively affect the 
level of repurchase in the year, although the coefficient of this variable is less than 
that of concurrent option exercises. This finding may suggest that managers would 
adjust the level of repurchase according to option exercises in the past. If much option 
is exercised in the last year, which caused an increase in the number of shares in the 
market, then firms may consider conducting more repurchases to counter such effect. 
It is understandable that firms take certain action such as buybacks in an ex-post way 
to alleviate dilution caused by past option exercises, given the fact that the time 
difference exists in firms’ decision-making.  
This is a new finding that repurchase level of firms would be positively influenced by 
latest option exercises since most of previous studies focus on the option-funding 
hypothesis, which supports that firms repurchase to fund the upcoming option 
exercises and avoid expected future earnings dilution.  
In our analysis on repurchase level, we also find evidence for option funding 
hypothesis. The number of total outstanding option (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡,𝑖) is positively related 
to the amount of repurchase. This finding is not surprising since firms would consider 
the effect of expected future option exercises when they make plans on repurchase. 
Previous literature (Bens et al., 2003) think that firms focus on diluted EPS rather than 
basic EPS. Diluted EPS would be ruined since the grants of options. Therefore, 
managers would time repurchase before actual option exercises to reduce common 
shares outstanding and avoid such dilution effect. Weisbenner (2000) supports 
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option-funding hypothesis and finds that ongoing repurchase over the life of an option 
is often the way for firms to offset the dilution to EPS caused by stock option grants. 
This is also consistent with our result that firms would increase repurchase level in the 
year when they expect more option to be exercised in the future. 
We find that contemporaneous relation is strongest in repurchase level, similar to that 
in repurchase decision. In other words, firms repurchase more in response to current 
option exercises instead of past or expected future exercises.  
It is possible that firms contemporaneously repurchase to meet the concurrent exercise 
of option, because they try to avoid dilution resulting from option exercise in the same 
year. By repurchasing shares from market, earning per share in the year would not 
decrease sharply. Since earning per share affects executives’ compensation, managers 
are motivated to manage EPS for their bonus plan payments (Guidry et al., 1999). 
Moreover, financial analysts and investors also attach much importance to EPS 
because it can be used as an indicator to assess a firm’s performance. In this case, it is 
no surprising that companies buy back shares to counter the dilution on EPS. Bens et 
al. (2003) think that executives focus on diluted EPS instead of basic EPS. However, 
our result provides evidence that managers are also concerned with basic EPS and 
they manage it by matching repurchase with concurrent option exercise to control the 
total number of shares in the market. 
Another explanation for contemporaneous relation between repurchase level and 
option exercises is that managers try to stabilize cash flow in the firm. Firms may use 
the proceeds of option exercises for financing the repurchase. Although repurchase 
typically causes a reduction in paid-in capital instead of earnings, this may affect the 
level of future earnings because cash on hand is reduced (Weisbenner, 2000). In 
addition, a drop in the cash sometimes would influence the interest earnings. By 
matching the proceeds of option exercises with the expenses on repurchase, the cash 
on hand in the firm will be more stable in this case. From the employees’ perspective, 
contemporaneous relationship between repurchase level and option exercised in the 
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same year implies that employees are more willing to match their payment of option 
exercise with the concurrent benefit from repurchased shares. 
Table 5 also indicates that managers would increase the actual amount of repurchases 
when they hold more options. Managers would adjust the repurchase level according 
to executive option holdings to pursue their benefit.  
After investigating the latest, current and expected future option exercises, the results 
show that both the likelihood of repurchase decision and the repurchase level are 
positively affected by all of these option exercise in different time. This provides 
evidence that firms make repurchase decision and adjust repurchase level after the 
comprehensive consideration for option exercises at different time. Moreover, the 
number of concurrent option exercise is a more important factor relative to that of 
latest and expected future ones. In addition, a higher managerial option holding leads 
to higher probability of repurchase decision as well as a high repurchase level. 
As for financial controls, traditional motives have an explanatory power on 
repurchase level from Table 5. The results are similar to the first model concerning 
repurchase decision. We find cash flow, firm size and takeover are positive related to 
repurchase level, while stock return and leverage have a negative relationship in the 
actual amount of repurchase.  
However, the coefficient of market-to-book ratio is not significant in repurchase level, 
which suggests MB ratio does not significantly affect the actual amount of repurchase. 
The coefficient of institutional ownership is positive and significant. This result 
indicates that tax incentives or tax differentials between income tax (dividends) and 
capital gains tax (repurchase) do not essentially change the repurchase plan for the 
firms. Firms with more individual shareholders do not show the preference for 
repurchase, instead firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to 
repurchase. 
5.3 Results from Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
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Panel A of Table 6 reports the results from propensity score matching, by comparing 
performances (measured by ROA in this part) between repurchasing firms with many 
stock option and repurchasing firms without many stock options (for else being 
equal).  
— Insert Table 6 about here — 
We find that the coefficient of dummy on “many” options is insignificantly different 
from zero. This result may suggest that return on total assets (ROA) of firms with 
repurchases would not be affected by a high holding of stock options.  
Previous studies report that stock option program helps align the incentives of 
employees with those of shareholders and thus improve firms’ performances 
(profitability) in some degree. However, profitability is more related with efficiency 
of the upper management so total employee outstanding in the analysis may not be a 
good proxy. Thus, in repurchasing firms, an increase in the number of total option 
outstanding may not lead to a significant improvement in performance.  
To study further, we set a “many managerial option” dummy which takes one if 
percentage of managerial option is in the 1st quartile within the same industry, 
otherwise zero. The result is shown in panel B of Table 6. By propensity score 
matching, we find that the coefficient of “many managerial option” dummy is 
significant and positive, and this supports that managerial options rather than total 
options have a positive effect on firms’ performance. 
Apart from the effect of “many” options, we also investigate the effect of repurchases 
on performances among firms with many options. In other words, we compare ROA 
in firms with both share buyback and many stock options and companies with no 
share buybacks but many options from the same industry for else being equal.  
Panel C of Table 6 shows the result by using propensity score matching method for 
this comparison. We find that for firms with many options, repurchase has a positive 
effect on ROA as the coefficient of repurchase dummy is positive, significantly 
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different from zero. 
Firms with many options are generally those which align interest of employees with 
that of shareholders. As we discussed above, profitability can be more associated with 
the efficiency of a firm’s management. As a flexible distribution method, repurchase 
can also be used to release undervaluation signal and undo dilution from option 
exercises for firms, and such firms typically are run by an active and dynamic 
management. Thus, repurchase behavior can reflect an effective discretionary of 
management which may lead to a better performance for such firms.  
Besides, repurchase announcements are usually followed by positive market reaction. 
Previous studies (Ikenberry et al., 2000) find that positive returns are associated with 
favorable subsequent events. It is also possible that firms repurchase shares when they 
get favorable news and expect an upcoming earning surprise. In this case, it is 
understandable that firms with buybacks are more likely to perform better than firms 
without buybacks for else being equal. However, the causality can be studied further 
since firms with better performances typically are more likely have excess capital to 
conduct repurchases. 
5.4 Robustness tests  
We ran several robustness tests of the regressions when we define or measure the 
repurchase level and some financial controls in a different method. It shows that the 
foregoing conclusions we draw do not materially change after these robustness tests.  
First, we redefined repurchase level in the regression as the dollar volume of 
repurchases divided by a) market value of equity at the end of year t (Rep_1t) and b) 
the current year end market value of equity at the beginning of year t (Rep_2t), 
respectively. The results are given in the Table 5. The column (B) and (C) report that 
the general conclusions on option exercises at different time estimating from these 
two regressions are similar to results in column (A). Although the magnitude of 
coefficient of concurrent option exercise (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡) is less significantly different from 
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that of latest exercise (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑡−1) when we redefine repurchase level with Rep_2t, it 
has a significantly stronger effect than the expected future option exercise(𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑡). 
Second, we measured firm size by the natural log of market value of equity instead of 
the natural log of total assets.  
Third, we re-estimate the model by using value-weighted stock return in the calendar 
year prior to the repurchase to proxy for stock price misvaluation.  
Fourth, we used the values of financial controls measured in the same year of 
repurchases to replace the lag values of them. 
The general results are still robust to these alternatives and changes. 
6. Conclusion 
Traditional explanations for repurchase motives include excess capital hypothesis, 
undervaluation hypothesis, optimal leverage ratio hypothesis and takeover deterrence 
hypothesis (Dittmar, 2000). Since 1990s, repurchase activities have been increasing 
rapidly. At the same time, stock options are also widely used in the firms as a kind of 
stock-based compensation. Therefore, some researchers link the growth of option 
programs in the firms with the surge in buybacks. 
Although previous studies give explanations for general quantitative relationship 
between repurchase and options, few of them focus on how firms time repurchase in 
response to option exercises. Option-funding hypothesis implies that firms buyback 
shares to meet the option exercises in the future, while undo dilution hypothesis 
suggests that repurchase can be used to counter the dilution to EPS caused by past 
option exercises. Besides, it is likely that firms repurchase shares in response to 
concurrent option exercises. However, few of researches test all of these hypotheses 
in one regression model. It is possible that repurchase is simultaneously affected by 
option exercises in different time. 
In this paper, we study repurchases and stock options in all US firms listed on 
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Compustat database and CRSP between 2000 and 2019 to further examine the time 
relationship between repurchases and stock options. 
We study the effect of option exercises at different time on the likelihood of decision 
to repurchase made by firms. Option exercised in the year prior to or the year of the 
repurchase and option outstanding have a positive relationship with the likelihood of 
repurchase decision. Moreover, contemporaneous relation is stronger than sequential 
relation, which may suggest that firms would consider concurrent option exercises 
more when they make the repurchase decision.  
Our results also show that the level of repurchase within the firms is positively 
associated with the volume of past, current and expected future option exercises. 
Firms would increase the actual amount of repurchase in the year to counter the 
dilution on earning per share caused by options exercises in the last year. Also, the 
positive relation between repurchase level and total options outstanding suggests that 
firms would use repurchase to fund stock options to be exercised in the expected 
future. Similarly, the strongest link between actual amount of buybacks and option 
exercises in the same year indicates that firms would pay more attention to concurrent 
option exercises than past option exercises and expected future option exercises when 
deciding the actual level of repurchases in the year.  
The stronger contemporaneous relation exists both in repurchase decision and 
repurchase level, which may suggest that firms use repurchases to avoid dilution 
effect of option exercises and to manage real-time EPS. Another explanation is that 
proceeds of option exercises in the same year can be used to fund repurchases, by 
doing so, cash available within the firms would not reduce suddenly and the cash flow 
would be more stable from companies’ level. For managers, they may prefer to match 
the payment of concurrent option exercise with benefit from repurchased shares 
(Griffin and Zhu, 2010). 
Our finding that executive options are positively related to repurchases is also 
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consistent with substitution hypothesis. Managers are motivated to use repurchases 
rather than dividends, because repurchases typically do not reduce the value of 
executive options while dividends would dilute the per share value of stock and 
decrease the price. All these results are robust to the other alternatives to financial 
controls and repurchase.  
Our theoretical contribution in this paper is that we use propensity score matching to 
compare the accounting performance of a) companies with share buyback and many 
stock options b) companies with share buybacks but not many stock options and c) 
companies with no share buybacks but many options from the same industry for else 
being equal. We find that repurchasing firms with many options do not perform better 
than similar firms without many options. However, a high holding of managerial 
options has a significant and positive effect on ROA. This finding shows that 
profitability of firms may be more related to upper management since executive stock 
options can help align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, which 
result in better performances for firms.  
On the other hand, our analysis suggests that firms with both many options and 
repurchase do better than firms only with many options in the control group in terms 
of ROA. Due to information asymmetry, repurchases conducted by insiders can be 
used to release undervaluation signal to the market conveying favorable news or 
showing optimism of management, and thus buybacks are often followed by earning 
surprises. This may explain why repurchases are associated with better ROA in the 
firms. It is also possible that firms with better performances are more likely to 
repurchase because such firms may have excess capital to buyback shares in the 
market.   
Further studies can examine causal relationship between firms’ performances and 
repurchase activities to investigate whether firms with better performances are more 
likely to repurchase because of their adequate funds or whether repurchases can in 
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Table 1: Sample distribution 
This table shows industry distribution of our sample of 18,483 firm-year observations from 2000 
to 2019 according to Fama-French 48 industry classification. Obs. is the number of firm-year 
observations. N is the number of firms. 
Economic Sector Obs. 
Percent 
(%) 




Agriculture 63 0.34 7 Electrical Equipment 293 1.59 28 
Food Products 431 2.33 43 Automobiles, Trucks 417 2.26 36 
Candy Soda 77 0.42 7 Aircraft 171 0.93 15 
Beer Liquor 94 0.51 8 Chemicals 655 3.54 65 
Tobacco Products 46 0.25 5 Defense 92 0.5 8 
Recreation 114 0.62 11 Precious Metals 50 0.27 6 
Entertainment 262 1.42 28 Mines 102 0.55 9 
Printing, Publishing 155 0.84 20 Coal 58 0.31 7 
Consumer Goods 490 2.65 45 Petrol, Natural Gas 1,048 5.67 114 
Apparel 399 1.83 36 Personal Services 326 1.76 29 
Healthcare 437 2.36 50 Business Services 2,672 14.46 299 
Medical Equipment 737 3.99 84 Computers 790 4.27 96 
Pharmaceutical 
Products 
1,021 5.52 124 
Electronic 
Equipment-chips 
1,469 7.95 149 
Shipbuilding, 
Railroad Equipment 
54 0.29 5 
Measuring, Control 
Equipment 
484 2.62 50 
Rubber and Plastic 
Products 
115 0.62 11 
Construction 
Materials 
503 2.72 44 
Textiles 78 0.42 7 Shipping Containers 105 0.57 9 
Business Supplies 285 1.54 31 Wholesale 783 4.24 77 
Construction 355 1.92 32 Retail 1,513 8.19 155 
Steel Works Etc 336 1.82 36 
Restaurants, Hotels, 
Motels 
472 2.55 52 
Fabricated Products 23 0.12 3 Other 89 0.48 11 
Machinery 879 4.76 88 Total 18,483 100 1,940 
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Table 2: Variable definitions and data sources 
This table presents description/calculation methods and the sources of all explanatory variables 
and financial controls in our study. All values of quantitative variables in model (1) and model (2) 
are winsorized at the 1st and 95th percentiles. 
Variable Description Source 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 Dummy variable takes the value 1 if firm repurchase in fiscal 




Average of market value in fiscal year t, calculated as average of 
previous year ending and current year ending market value. 
[(MKVt-1+ MKVt) / 2] 
Compustat 
AvgAT Average of total assets in fiscal year t, calculated as average of 
previous fiscal year ending and current fiscal year ending total 
assets. [(ATt-1+ ATt) / 2]  
Compustat 
Rept Level of actual repurchase volume in fiscal year t in dollar 
volume, defined as purchase of stock minus decreases in 
preferred stock divided by average market value in fiscal year t, 
([prstkct -prstkpct] / AvgMKVt). 
Compustat 
Rep_1t Rep_1t is the alternative to repurchase level (Rept), which is 
defined as dollar volumet normalized by market value in the 
ending of fiscal year t ([prstkct -prstkpct]) /MKVt). 
Compustat 
Rep_2t Rep_2t is the alternative to repurchase level(Rept), which is 
defined as dollar volumet normalized by market value in the 
ending of fiscal year t-1 ([prstkct -prstkpct]) /MKVt-1). 
Compustat 
ROA Return on assets, a measure of accounting performance, denotes 
the profitability of the firm, calculated as net income divided by 




This variable represents total options exercises in the fiscal year 
t, defined as number of total employee option exercises in the 
fiscal year t divided by the number of common outstanding 




This variable represents total options exercises in the fiscal year 
t-1, defined as number of total employee option exercises in the 
fiscal year t divided by the number of common outstanding 




Option outstanding in fiscal year t is a proxy of expected future 
option exercises, defined as the average of total options 
outstanding in the beginning of the fiscal year t and in the end of 
fiscal year t ([Optosbyt + Optoseyt]/2), divided by the number of 




Executive option outstanding in fiscal year t, defined as the 
number of executive option outstanding (Opt_Unex_Exer_Num 
+Opt_Unex_Unexer_Num) in fiscal year t divided by the 




Table 2 (Continued)  
variable Description Source 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑡−1 
Executive option outstanding in fiscal year t-1 is defined as the 
number of executive option outstanding in fiscal year t-1 





Employee option outstanding (non-managerial option) in fiscal 
year t, defined as total option outstanding in fiscal year minus 
executive option outstanding in fiscal year t scaled by the 





The level of cash flow in fiscal year t is calculated as operating 
income before depreciation minus capital expenditures, divided 





MB ratio in fiscal year t represents investment opportunities, 
calculated as market value in (Mkvalt+Dltt+Dlc+Pstk) in fiscal 
year t divided by book value of total assets in fiscal year t. 
Compustat 
Firm size Firm size in year t is defined as natural logarithm of total assets 
in fiscal year t. 
Compustat 
Return holding period return in fiscal year t is calculated by 
multiplying the holding period return for each month (Ret) for 
the fiscal year t. 
CRSP 
Database 
Leverage Leverage ratio in year t is defined as long-term debt (Dltt) 
divided by total assets for the fiscal year t. 
Compustat 
Takeover Takeover dummy in year t takes the value 1 if the company is a 




The percentage of shares held by institutions, defined as number 
of shares of institution divided by common shares outstanding. 
Thomson 
Reuters 
“Many” option A dummy variable which takes the value 1 if total options 
normalized by common outstanding shares is in the 1st quartile 




A dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the percent of 
managerial options is in the 1st quartile within the same 
industry in fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise. 
Execucomp 
Industry indicators Dummies according to Fama French 48 classifications for 
industry are used to control industry fixed effects. The dummy 
value takes the value 1 if the firm is from a particular industry 




Year indicators Year dummy variables can be used to control annual fixed 
effects. For example, V2009 equals 1 if the data is from the 






Table 3: Descriptive statistics  
The table shows means, medians and standard deviation (SD), minimum (Min) and maximum 
(Max) for all sample firms used in the study. Panel A and B are differentiated between 
repurchasing and non-repurchasing groups respectively, with p -value for a two-sided difference in 
means as shown in panel (B). 
 
Total sample (n=18,483) 
 Mean Median SD Min Max  
RepuDummyt 0.672 1 0.470 0 1  
Rep   0.022 0.006 0.030 0 0.143  
Rep_1 0.023 0.006 0.033 0 0.171  
Rep_2 t 0.022 0.006 0.030 0 0.134  
OptExt 0.010  0.006  0.010  0.00 0.136   
OptOutt  0.061  0.051  0.048  0.00  0.312   
ExecOptOutt 0.020  0.015  0.019  0.00 0.330   
EmployeeOptOutt 0.041 0.032 0.035 0.00 0.159  
Cash flow 0.082  0.090  0.102  -0.78  0.288   
Market-to-book ratio 3.180  2.915  5.663  -104.55  32.177   
Size 7.390  7.355  1.534  3.20  10.643   
Return 0.110  0.090  0.395  -0.92  2.085   
Leverage 0.185  0.166  0.165  0.00 0.745   
Institutional ownership 0.804  0.841  0.186  0.03  1.133   
Takeover 0.345 0.000 0.475 0.00 1  
ROA 0.433 0.056 0.175 -10.19 2.61  
 Panel A: Repurchasing subsample (n=12,412) 
 Mean Median SD Min Max  
OptExt 0.010 0.007 0.010 0.00 0.048  
OptOutt  0.058 0.048 0.047 0.00 0.216  
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ExecOptOutt 0.018 0.013 0.018 0.00 0.084  
EmployeeOptOutt 0.039 0.030 0.035 0.00 0.159  
Cash flow 0.100 0.101 0.087 -0.78 0.288  
Market-to-book ratio 3.365 3.087 6.049 -104.55 32.177  
Size 7.641 7.614 1.474 3.32 10.643  
Return 0.097 0.085 0.357 -0.92 2.085  
Leverage 0.184 0.167 0.161 0.00 0.671  
Institutional ownership 0.816 0.846 0.168 0.028 1.133  
Takeover 0.439 0 0.496 0.00 1.000  
ROA 0.063 0.064 0.102 -1.23 1.541  
 Panel B: Non-repurchasing subsample (n=6,071) 
 Mean Median SD Min Max p-value  
OptExt 0.009 0.005 0.01 0.00 0.136 0.46 
OptOutt  0.067 0.057 0.05 0.00 0.312 0.30 
ExecOptOutt 0.024 0.018 0.02 0.00 0.330 0.37 
EmployeeOptOutt 0.042 0.035 0.035 0.00 0.159 0.00 
Cash flow 0.047 0.068 0.12 -0.78 0.268 0.00 
Market-to-book ratio 2.805 2.595 4.76 -104.55 21.46 0.00 
Size 6.879 6.793 1.53 3.20 10.58 0.00 
Return 0.140 0.107 0.47 -0.92 2.08 0.01 
Leverage 0.187 0.164 0.17 0.00 0.745 0.42 
Institutional ownership 0.777 0.824 0.22 0.028 1.133 0.01 
Takeover 0.152 0.152 0.36 0.00 1.000 0.00 
ROA 0.003 0.036 0.26 -10.19 2.611 0.00 
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Table 4: Results for repurchase decision 
This table presents the results of Logistic regression on repurchase decision using panel data in our 
study. The dependent variable in the regression is binary variable (RepuDummy) which takes the 
value 1 if any repurchase occurs in the fiscal year t and 0 if not. Option holdings are scaled by 
common shares outstanding. See Table 2 for definitions of variables. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Dependent variable=𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 



















   
ExecOptOutt 13.487*** 
（3.63） 





   -15.523*** 
(3.45) 
 
EmployeeOptOutt     2.277** 
(1.13) 
 



















































Industry Indicator Yes    Yes  Yes  
Year Indicator Yes    Yes  Yes  
Obs 18,483 18,483 18,483 
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.20 0.21 
VIF Max 7.15 2.05 7.02 
VIF Mean 2.60 1.47 2.39 
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Table 5: Results for repurchase level 
This table presents the results of Tobit regression for model (2). The dependent variable in Column 
(A) is repurchase level in fiscal year t (REPt),calculated as the actual amount of repurchase divided 
by average market value of firm in fiscal year t. Average market value is the average of market 
value at the beginning and at the end of the fiscal year t. The alternative to repurchase level 
REP_1t (REP_2t) is defined as actual repurchase amount divided by market value in the end of the 
fiscal year t (in the end of the fiscal year t-1), and the results are shown in Column (B) and 
Column (C). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***,**,* denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
10% levels, respectively.  
 Column (A)  Column (B)  Column (C)  





















































































Industry Indicator Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Indicator Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs 18,483  18,483  18,483  
χ2 3605.05  3432.61  3671.69  
Prob>χ2 0.00  0.00  0.00  
VIF Max 7.15  7.15  7.15  
VIF Mean 2.60  2.60  2.60  
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Table 6: Results of Propensity Score Matching 
This table shows the comparison results of ROA by propensity score matching (PSM). The 
dependent variable is return on assets (ROA). The sample used in panel A and panel B consists of 
all repurchasing firms in full sample. The treatment variable in Panel A is “many” option dummy, 
which equals 1 if the number of total options normalized by common outstanding shares falls in 
the 1st quartile within the same industry and 0 otherwise. The treatment variable in Panel B is 
“many” managerial option dummy, which equals 1 if the percent of managerial options falls in the 
1st quartile within the same industry and 0 otherwise. The sample used in Panel C comprises all 
firms with many options in the full sample. The treatment variable in Panel C is repurchase 





(1 vs 0) 
Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z| 
 
Number of obs used 






(1 vs 0) 
Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z| 
 
Number of obs used 
0.0048 0.00260 1.84 0.066 9,038 
Panel C 
RepuDummy 
(1 vs 0) 
Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z| 
 
Number of obs used 
0.0154 0.00917 1.68 0.093 3,388 
 
 
